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RESUMEN 
En este trabajo se aborda una doble problemática: por un lado, estudiamos el 
comportamiento de los individuos en cuanto a la búsqueda de trabajo y la 
medida en la cual los salarios de reserva y subsidios de desempleo juegan un 
papel relevante en la transición a la vida laboral. Por otro lado, pretendemos 
averiguar si los factores que condicionan el proceso de búsqueda de empleo 
también afectan tanto a los salarios como a la estabilidad laboral de las 
personas que finalmente consiguen un trabajo. 
A tal fin se ha realizado un análisis empírico que combina la estimación de 
modelos estructurales a través de ecuaciones simultáneas con las técnicas de 
estimación con variables instrumentales. Los datos empleados proceden del 
Panel de Hogares de la Unión Europea (PHOGUE) para el periodo 1995-2001. 
En particular la submuestra utilizada corresponde a las observaciones para 
hombres y mujeres encuestados en los países del Sur de Europa (Italia, 
Grecia, España y Portugal). Algunos de los resultados obtenidos en nuestros 
análisis resultan esclarecedores, especialmente en lo relativo a las diferencias 
entre países. 
Palabras clave: Transiciones laborales, prestaciones por desempleo, salarios 
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In our piece of work we are facing a two-fold problem: on the one hand, we 
study the behaviour of job seekers and the extent to which reservation wages 
and unemployment benefits play a relevant role in the transition into working 
life. On the other hand, we intend to find out whether the determinants of the job 
search process may also affect subsequent wages. 
We undertake an empirical approach combining one-step estimations with two-
step instrumental variables techniques. The data used to this end come from 
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for the period 1995-2001. 
To be precise, the sub-sample gathers both male and female Southern 
European (Italian, Greek, Spanish and Portuguese) workers. From the results of 
the analysis important subtleties arise, particularly related to differences across 
countries. 
Keywords: Transitions into work, unemployment benefits, reservation wages, 
earnings. 
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1.  Introduction     
  The  second  half  of  the  nineties  was  a  period  characterised  by  decreasing 
unemployment and inflation rates all over the European Union. Despite this positive trend 
and the potential effect of numerous policy measures trying to make the labour market more 
flexible
1,  the  long-term  unemployment  rate  remained  high  in  most  of  these  countries 
(Machin & Manning, 1999). The costs of these high long-term unemployment shares are 
considerable  both  for  the  individual  and  the  society,  consequently  understanding  the 
mechanisms that lie behind the unemployment duration is a matter of major concern from 
both analytical and policy perspectives.  
In  the  literature  to  date  it  has  been  hypothesized  that  reservation  wages  is  an 
important  concept  for  modelling  certain  relevant  aspects  of  labor  market  dynamics, 
particularly  unemployment  duration.  In  this  sense  to  investigate  the  factors,  both 
microeconomics  and  macroeconomics,  that  influence  the  reservation  wage  is  also  of 
substantial interest. Among these factors, unemployment benefits (UB) have been revealed 
as a key issue to explain adjustments on reservation wages and so changes on unemployment 
duration; since benefits generosity is expected to raise reservation wages of the unemployed, 
it should affect the quality of subsequent job matches. Most empirical studies show negative 
effects of UB on unemployment duration (Devine & Kiefer (1991), Machin & Manning 
(1999)),  i.e.  benefits  lead  to  longer  unemployment  spells
2,  although  this  effect  is  rather 
small.  However,  to  our  knowledge  there  is  not  empirical  evidence  on  how  this  likely 
correlation affect specifically to youngsters living in countries with highly similar welfare 
states. As far as we can provide politicians with some quantitative evidence on how powerful 
is  the  potential  correlation  between  those  variables  we  would  be  contributing  to  design 
effective policies to help those from the most disadvantaged, in terms of unemployment, age 
group (i.e. the youngsters) to achieve an accurate job-matching..  
The extent to which UB change unemployment duration would be reflected in the 
individual’s reservation wage
3. Consequently the comparison of the reservation wages with 
the actual wages the individual receive once a job is found would be also of interest, in order 
                                                 
1 This resulted in a transfer of economic risks from employers to employees by means of various flexible 
employment arrangements (Regini, 2000). 
2 See Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) for an exhaustive review of this literature. 
3 Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) suggest that in a labour market with search frictions unemployment benefits 
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to analyse the factors affecting the long-term unemployment rate, as this will tell us about 
the robustness of the reservation wage as a measure of the individual labour preferences
4.   
Thus, among other things, what we intend to answer in this paper is whether the 
reservation wage is a good indicator of the difficulties to find a job and whether the existence 
of unemployment benefits are actually encouraging youngsters to stay as unemployed. We 
pretend to shed further light on this by estimating simple econometric models for several 
countries  belonging  to  the  European  Union  (EU,  henceforth).  To  be  precise  we  gather 
information for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain because of their labour market and welfare 
state similarities. In fact, these four countries may be classified among those with high index 
of strictness of employment protection on the basis of an assessment of national legislations 
(OECD,  1999)  and  less  generosity  of  unemployment  benefits,  namely  the  coverage  of 
unemployment  insurance  and  unemployment  assistance  (the  fraction  of  unemployed 
receiving some form of UBs) times the average gross replacement rate in the first-year of 
receipt of unemployment benefits (Boeri et al. 2004). As we are not provided in our dataset 
with  a  precise  figure  on  the  amount  of  benefits  perceived  by  the  unemployed  it  results 
absolutely crucial to compare Spain with similar countries in terms of (low) generosity of 
unemployment benefits. Moreover, due to technical reasons (low expected ratio of response), 
Eurostat  withdrew  a  larger  sample  from  Southern  European  countries  what,  joint  to  the 
higher  proportion  of  unemployed  workers  in  these  countries,  made  the  sample  more 
representative. 
In  the  same  vein,  analyzing  cross-country  differences  in  the  reservation  wage-
unemployment  duration  relation  may  be  informative  about  how  labor  markets  with 
apparently no big differences in terms of institutions have an effect on the search-for-a-job. 
What is more, as there is typically little variation in the rules and regulations of UB within 
one country in a relatively short time period and for identification purposes it would be 
helpful to take profit of some cross-country variation as well
5. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the next section we draw a picture of the 
literature on reservation wages and unemployment duration.  We then move on to present a 
simple  econometric  framework  to  capture  the  different  concepts  analysed  in  this  paper 
(unemployment  benefits,  reservation  wages  and  unemployment  duration),  including  a 
discussion about the potential for using unemployment benefits as an instrumental variable. 
                                                 
4 It may also be an indicator of depreciation of the human capital and the social networks or contacts in the 
labour market of the unemployed. 




























  3 
The data are described in Section 4, which complementary includes a brief portrayal of the 
institutional  framework  upsetting  the  four  countries  considered.  Section  5  reports  the 
econometric estimation results. Finally, we summarise the main conclusions in section 6. 
 
2.  Literature background 
The most commonly used theoretical framework for analysing the variables involved 
in transitions from unemployment to work is the job search model. According to this theory 
individuals who want to improve their labour market positions look for a job (which is 
supposed to be completely characterized by the wage). To put things simply, unemployed 
are to invest time and resources on job search given the imperfect information in the labour 
market about available vacancies. In doing so, they are going to accept only wages which 
maximise  the  future  flow  of  income  along  life  course  net  of  search  costs.  The  optimal 
stopping rule is given by a certain wage, which is called reservation wage, which defines the 
minimum level of income below which the worker will not offer a single hour of his work 
capacity. A measure of this reservation wage is seldom observed directly; that is why it is 
usually inferred from the distribution of accepted wages.  
In this framework, job opportunities decrease along time for several reasons (state 
dependence, self-selection, scarring
6, obsolescence of human capital
7 among others), and 
therefore reservation wages should decrease along time until they reach a reasonable value 
that matches the available job offers given the job search elapsed duration.  
In the empirical testing of the job search theory, as far as transitions into work are 
concerned,  we  can  distinguish  between,  at  least,  two  ways  of  tackling  the  interrelations 
between  the  relevant  variables  in  the  model:  reduced  models  and  structural  approaches. 
Among  the  former  the  most  common  approach  consists  on  the  specification  of  hazard 
functions to estimate transition rates and subsequent wages. Structural models rather focus 
on the relations between the relevant variables of the model, and try to achieve structural 
estimators including sometimes information about the demand side.  
Among the papers that are provided with explicit information on reservation wages 
and relate this reported variable to the observed duration of the unemployment period we 
could mention Lancaster and Chesher (1983), Poterba (1984), Lancaster (1985), Mortensen 
(1986),  Jensen  &  Westergård-Nielsen  (1987),  Wolpin  (1987),  Jones  (1988),  Kiefer  & 
                                                 
6 See Arulampalam et al (2000). 
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Neuman (1989), Devine & Kiefer (1991), Gorter and Gorter (1993), Van den Berg and 
Gorter  (1997),  Bloemen  and  Stancanelli  (2001)  and  Prasad  (2003).  In  the  following 
paragraph we summarize some of these contributions. 
As example of papers estimating reduced models we find, along with many others, 
Jensen  &  Westergård-Nielsen  (1987)  and  Wolpin  (1987).  Jensen  &  Westergård-Nielsen 
(1987) specify and estimate a search model, which they apply to the transition from school to 
work on a very homogeneous data set from law graduates who are looking for their first job. 
Using maximum likelihood methods they establish a job search model which allows them to 
estimate  both  the  transition  rates  and  reservation  wages.  They  estimate  the  elasticity  of 
offered wages to different features such as previous working experience during the degree 
and  confirm  the  expected  positive  link  between  employment  prospects  and  reservation 
wages.  
As for Wolpin (1987), he is not provided with direct information about reservation 
wages but still is able to derive them from both the duration of search and the distribution of 
observed wages. He finds quite low and decreasing reservation wages and offer probabilities 
with time.  
On the other hand Gorter and Gorter (1993) construct a structural search model based 
on the stationary search theory which allow them to compute the elasticity across several 
relevant  variables  in  the  search  model  (namely,  reservation  wages,  the  perception  of 
unemployment  benefits  and  the  arrival  rate  of  offers).  They  tackle  simultaneity  in  the 
resolution of the main relations between variables by introducing instrumental variables in a 
two-step  least  square  (2SLS)  estimation  where  benefits  are  used  as  an  instrument  for 
reservation wages. 
A few years before, Jones (1988) had developed a simple and stationary job search 
theory  to  show  how  (reported)  reservation  wages  and  duration  of  unemployment  are 
interrelated. He used a simultaneous framework by treating the plausible endogeneity of 
reservation wages on unemployment duration through an instrumental variables approach, 
which produces interesting and visible changes in the results. He asserts that simultaneity 
and the control for endogeneity are important in the assessment of reservation wages and 
duration. What is clear is that regardless of the relationship between duration and reservation 
wages, this duration dependence would require longitudinal data to estimate the relevance of 
reservation wages through time. Our study draws on Jones (1988) to the extent that we make 
use of a model of elapsed duration of unemployment and exploit reported reservation wages 
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the one in Lancaster (1985), and drives to a log linear relation between both variables of 
interest.  Jones  (1988)  finds  when  tackling  endogeneity  in  the  main  explanatory  variable 
(reservation wages) that the effect of this is even higher than in the OLS estimation.  
It  may  be  argued  that  hazard  models  are  the  most  useful  when  unemployment 
duration is analysed. However we do not agree on this as the best choice when the estimates 
rely on the ECHP for, at least, two reasons:  firstly, we can not observe the starting point of 
the unemployment episodes (i.e. our measures of unemployment duration is a left censored 
variable), thus we can not conduct a proper duration analyses; secondly, transitions from 
unemployment to employment are rather sensitive to attrition and recall problems. 
As mentioned in the introductory section, this piece of work would like to enlarge the 
empirical evidence not only on the duration of reaching a job but also the wage formation in 
this  job  across  Southern  European  youths.  In  this  context  both  the  returns  from  human 
capital investment (wages) and the time spent in and (involuntary) out of employment are 
thought  as  measures  of  worker’s  ‘success’
8.  We  will  briefly  analyse  this  in  section  5, 
following  a  somewhat  similar  approach  to  that  undertaken  by  Prasad  (2003),  who 
graphically examines the correlation between reported reservation wages and earnings. 
 
3.  Econometric model 
Following Jones (1988) we use the standard stationary search model, which assumes 
that  the  distribution  of  offers  is  characterized completely  by  the  wage  they  entail.  As  a 
consequence  job  offers  below  some  reservation  wage  are  rejected  and  exceeding  it  are 
accepted. An important assumption is the stationarity of the labour market. This assumption 
is quite strong, but it makes a structural analysis possible
9.  
In general, the probability of receiving an offer is assumed to be constant per unit of 
time. The hazard is given by
10: 
µ=θ(1-F(r))    (1) 
where r represent the reservation wage. Therefore the probability of being employed is the 
product of the probabilities that an offer is received and that it is accepted. 
Following Jones (1988) we assume that the probability of accepting an offer depends 
on a vector X of observable personal and regional characteristics; adopting the form: 
                                                 
8 Dolton et al (2005) summarises alternative measures of occupational ‘success’.  
9 See Van den Berg (1990) for a discussion about the implications of this assumption. 
10 A specification of the hazard function is equivalent to a specification of the distribution of unemployment 
duration. In a different context it could be argued that hazard models are more accurate that linear models, but 
as far as we observe unemployment spells at the time of the interview (no when the transition into employment 
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θA
α=exp (X’β+u)  (2) 
where β is a parameter vector and u is an error term. 
  To test the optimal search theory of positive clear correlation between duration of 
unemployment and reservation wage, and to obviate the problem of endogeneity between 
these two variables, we use a reduced-form instrumental variables estimation approach. A 
potential variable for instrumenting the reservation wages in the search duration equation is 
the unemployment benefit
11, as far as this could be highly correlated with reservation wage 
but  with  no  further  influences  on  the  probability  of  moving  from  unemployment  to 
employment. Besides, these reservation wages are, broadly speaking, a function of total non-
employment related income including elements that are unaffected by employment status. 
Thus, it seems plausible to use this as an additional instrument.  
Hui (1991) presents a concise summary of the underlying assumptions of the search 
model and the implications for estimation procedures. He supports the idea that 2SLS is the 
appropriate  technique  for  estimating  a  two-equations  model  of  the  determinants  of 
reservation wages and duration of unemployment. 
Given that we are using a pool of waves, which means we have repeated observations 
on individuals, we need to cluster errors across individuals. This will result in robust errors 
in our estimations as a consequence of a Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance in 
place of the traditional calculation. The rationale for this is that observations are independent 
across groups (interviewees) but not necessarily independent within groups. 
   
4.  Data 
The information analysed in this paper comes largely from the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP)
12 for the period 1995-2001
13. We have selected the subsample of 
workers younger than 40 at the end of the observation period. The main reason for choosing 
this threshold age is that around this age is the time of the life cycle at which unemployment 
rates, particularly for men, tend to stabilise (see figures A1 and A2, Appendix A). This is the 
result of two trends: it is the threshold age from which transitions from unemployment into 
employment become less frequent, as well as the age at which mobility from employment 
into other situations finds its minimum. From forty years old onwards we start observing 
                                                 
11  Alternatively  some  authors  have  proposed  to  make  use  of  not  only  unemployment  benefits  but  also 
supplementary benefits as instrument for reservation wages. We have only taken into account unemployment 
benefits as this variable seems to keep a much more apparent correlation with the reservation wages. 
12 Peracchi (2002) presents a summary of the main characteristics of the ECHP. 
13 The first wave of this panel survey (1994) is not considered in the analyses due to the lack of information on 
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transitions into unemployment and inactivity that may cause some blurring effects on the 
main foundation of the job search model we are using in this research
14.  
We have to bear in mind when analysing this dataset that panel data usually suffer 
from a potential problem of attrition
15 and the ECHP is not an exception. Unfortunately there 
is little we can do to solve this
16.  
An additional problem we have to face is that there is obviously no way to check the 
validity of the answers to the question on how long the interviewees have been searching for 
work.  Given  that  we  know  that  individuals’  recall  of  length  of  spells  has  considerable 
measurement error as short spells are often forgotten and there is considerable rounding in 
answers, we would expect the responses to have considerable measurement error (see, for 
example, Torelli and Trivellato, 1993). In this paper we do not use monthly labor market 
histories because of the huge amount of inconsistencies found when this task was undertaken 
in the ECHP. Besides, as the other variables are recorded on an annual basis, it is fairly 
difficult to connect the corresponding figures to each unemployment spell. Thus we use 
yearly  labor  market  histories,  and  the  data  on  unemployment  duration  are  expressed  in 
months
17.  
In our analysis we do not control for the level of unemployment compensation as it 
results impossible to precisely know how much the worker received during each month of 
the unemployment spell. Instead we would introduce in our estimates a dummy indicator for 
individuals who, at some point during the unemployment spell, receive some unemployment 
benefits
18.  As  above  mentioned  this  is  the  main  reason  why  we  restrict  our  empirical 
approach to countries with similar (low) levels of unemployment benefits. 
Regarding  with  the  dependent  variables  in  our  estimates,  we  have  to  face  two 
different problems: on the one hand, the unemployment spells included in the sample are 
right censored because our data are on elapsed duration from the start of the unemployment 
spell to  the  time  of  survey  and  consequently  represent  interrupted  spells.  This  has  been 
                                                 
14 For sake of space the regarding figures are not reported. The interested reader can obtain them from the 
authors upon request. 
15 Recently, Nicholetti and Peracchi (2004) have analysed the survey response patterns in the ECHP. 
16 A potential strategy for tackling attrition is to consider the possibility of it being endogenous to the system: 
long term unemployed might be more prone to stay in the sample than those who get a job, since employed 
people tend to be more difficult to find by the interviewers. Nevertheless, considering the potential endogeneity 
of the loss of sample would complicate unnecessarily the estimation if we assume that, in the selection of 
explanatory variables in the estimations (gender, age, family composition, etc), we include those that explain 
attrition. 
17 These data are rather more grouped than would be ideal, though. 
18 As pointed out by Narendranathan et al (1985) the estimations are rather sensitive to precisely how benefits 
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accounted for in the empirical approach; the duration of unemployment for those who have 
been out of the labour force is the sum of the duration of the first unemployment spell and 
the duration of the spell out of the labour force.  
On the other hand, reservation wages are measured by the response to the question 
ps007. We give in detail the question since the precise wording is important: “Minimum net 
monthly income the person would accept to work the number of hours indicated in ps002
19”. 
Therefore this information was collected only for individuals who report to be searching a 
job. 
As  regards  the  exogenous  variables,  we  are  using  two  types  of  macroeconomic 
variables. Firstly, we have withdrawn the gender specific regional unemployment rates from 
Eurostat
20. This has to be taken as a proxy for aggregate demand conditions. Secondly, we 
use country dummies and year dummies to control for structural differences across countries 
and  years,  as  well  as  eventual  changes  in  the  legislation  or  in  aspects  of  the  economic 
business cycle we may not grasp with the unemployment rate. The mixing of macro and 
micro variables is sometimes controversial, and usually macro variables, that may affect in a 
different way to different people or that have not the right level of desegregation, are hardly 
significant,  as  will  be  the  case  here.  Nevertheless,  the  significance  of  the  regional 
unemployment rate does not vary when dummy year variables are added to the specifications 
and for this reason we keep both in the estimates. 
Tables 1.1 and 1.2. show summary statistics, distinguishing by gender and countries, 
for all the variables used in the analysis. 
The figures stated in Table 1.1 disclose some well established differences between 
male and female workers. Men report higher hourly reservation wages (approximately 10% 
higher)  than  women  and  slightly  lower  unemployment  spells  (2.15  months  on  average), 
despite his lower formal qualification level, on average. Moreover they are exposed to much 
lower regional unemployment rates (roughly 9% below), regardless of the time at which this 
is accounted for. It deserves our attention the fact that the amount of hours per week the 
individual would prefer to work is close to the actual ones reported for those working
21, what 
means that, possibly, the unemployed adapt their expectations to the lack of working time 
flexibility remaining at the labour market.  
                                                 
19 PS002: “Assuming you could find suitable work, how many hours per week would you prefer to work in this 
new job?”. 
20 Regional unemployment rates are provided by the European Statistic Database REGIO. 





























  9 
Not  surprisingly,  bearing  in  mind  that  we  are  analysing  youth  unemployed  from 
Southern Europe, there is a high proportion of men and women staying at home during the 
unemployment period, being the differences between these figures statistically significant
22. 
Unlike, the fraction of individuals receiving unemployment benefits is virtually the same. 
 
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics by gender 
  Both  Female  Male 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
             
Ln (reservation wage) (€ PPP)  1.49  0.44  1.45  0.45  1.55  0.42 
Ln (months unemployed)  3.08  1.44  3.12  1.41  3.02  1.48 
Desired working hours  38.82  5.81  38.09  5.98  39.67  5.48 
Age:             
Age 25-29  0.29  0.46  0.29  0.45  0.30  0.46 
Age 30-34  0.17  0.37  0.16  0.37  0.17  0.38 
Age 35-39  0.04  0.19  0.04  0.19  0.03  0.18 
Married or living with partner  0.21  0.41  0.27  0.44  0.15  0.36 
Education level:             
Upper secondary education  0.38  0.49  0.40  0.49  0.35  0.48 
Higher education or equivalent  0.14  0.35  0.17  0.38  0.11  0.31 
Living with parents  0.80  0.40  0.74  0.44  0.86  0.34 
Number of children aged 5 or less  0.12  0.38  0.14  0.40  0.10  0.35 
Number of children aged 6-14  0.24  0.59  0.26  0.61  0.21  0.56 
Net family income 10
3 €  15.80  12.46  16.10  12.95  15.44  11.85 
Unemployment benefits dummy  0.11  0.31  0.10  0.31  0.11  0.31 
Household members at work  1.10  0.92  1.14  0.89  1.05  0.94 
Regional unemployment:             
Regional unemployment rate at the interview date  19.28  9.06  23.47  9.18  14.32  5.83 
Regional unemployment rate when started unem.  17.99  8.35  21.75  8.54  13.53  5.42 
Unemployment rate imputation  0.02  0.14  0.02  0.14  0.02  0.14 
Actual wage (t+1)*  4.87  2.21  4.68  2.33  5.05  2.08 
Year dummies:             
Year 1996  0.17  0.38  0.17  0.38  0.17  0.38 
Year 1997  0.16  0.37  0.16  0.37  0.16  0.36 
Year 1998  0.14  0.35  0.14  0.35  0.15  0.35 
Year 1999  0.13  0.34  0.13  0.34  0.13  0.34 
Year 2000  0.12  0.32  0.11  0.32  0.12  0.32 
Year 2001  0.10  0.30  0.10  0.30  0.10  0.30 
             
Observations  14073  7617  6456 
* The value for this variable is only observed for those unemployed that find a job one year after.  
Source: Author's own calculations from ECHP 1995-2001 (sample restricted to unemployed people). 
 
Moving on to the mean values reported in Table 1.2, it should be highlighted that, in 
general, there are not huge differences across countries. Nevertheless some figures require 
our attention. Reservation wages are identical in Spain and Greece, and by far higher than in 
Portugal  where  there  are  statistically  significant  differences  between  men  and  women 
(13.9%). On the contrary, Italian unemployed show longer elapsed unemployment spells and 
higher reservation wages. Similarly, it is the country, within this group, with lower ratio of 
youngsters perceiving unemployment benefits. Therefore even when the four countries are 
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subject  to  similar  welfare  protection  systems  there  is  some  degree  of  disparity  in  the 
proportion of young unemployed perceiving unemployment benefits. This difference will be 
exploited in our econometric estimates. 
Turning to Portugal it seems particularly striking the proportion of young married 
women (almost half of the sample), which translates into higher number of children and, 
probably, into low levels of participation in Higher Education. Despite these figures Portugal 
states the lowest regional unemployment rate. 
 
Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics by country and gender 
  Italy  Greece 
  Female  Male  Female  Male 
Variable  Mean  Std.  
Dev.  Mean  Std.  
Dev.  Mean  Std.  
Dev.  Mean  Std.  
Dev. 
                 
Ln (reservation wage) (€ PPP)  1.69  0.32  1.72  0.31  1.37  0.56  1.44  0.61 
Ln (months unemployed)  3.59  1.30  3.63  1.31  3.10  1.27  2.97  1.37 
Desired working hours  36.60  5.74  38.83  4.93  38.52  6.69  39.51  7.25 
Age:                 
Age 25-29  0.29  0.45  0.31  0.46  0.30  0.46  0.35  0.48 
Age 30-34  0.16  0.37  0.16  0.37  0.14  0.34  0.16  0.36 
Age 35-39  0.04  0.19  0.03  0.17  0.03  0.18  0.03  0.18 
Married or living with partner  0.19  0.39  0.10  0.30  0.27  0.44  0.12  0.32 
Education level:                 
Upper secondary education  0.53  0.50  0.41  0.49  0.55  0.50  0.50  0.50 
Higher education or equivalent  0.09  0.29  0.06  0.24  0.22  0.42  0.15  0.36 
Living with parents  0.82  0.38  0.91  0.29  0.76  0.43  0.90  0.30 
Number of children aged 5 or less  0.10  0.35  0.06  0.28  0.12  0.38  0.08  0.34 
Number of children aged 6-14  0.19  0.49  0.16  0.46  0.23  0.57  0.11  0.37 
Net family income 10
3 €  17.34  11.77  16.25  11.87  14.51  11.32  13.64  9.58 
Unemployment benefits dummy  0.03  0.17  0.03  0.16  0.10  0.31  0.12  0.32 
Household members at work  1.07  0.85  0.99  0.90  1.25  0.88  1.15  0.94 
Regional unemployment:                 
Regional unemployment rate as at the interview date  25.98  8.88  16.06  5.37  17.34  2.04  7.77  1.51 
Regional unemployment rate when started as unemployed  23.95  7.90  14.30  4.31  14.85  1.70  7.03  1.38 
Unemployment rate imputation  0.01  0.08  0.01  0.09  0.02  0.15  0.02  0.13 
Actual wage (t+1)  6.03  2.37  6.05  1.85  3.89  1.85  3.99  1.55 
Year dummies:                 
Year 1996  0.15  0.36  0.15  0.36  0.19  0.39  0.15  0.35 
Year 1997  0.14  0.35  0.14  0.35  0.16  0.37  0.16  0.36 
Year 1998  0.16  0.37  0.15  0.36  0.12  0.32  0.14  0.35 
Year 1999  0.15  0.35  0.15  0.36  0.12  0.33  0.13  0.34 
Year 2000  0.13  0.33  0.13  0.34  0.11  0.32  0.14  0.35 
Year 2001  0.12  0.32  0.12  0.32  0.09  0.29  0.10  0.30 
                 
Observations  2867  2996  1491  913 
* The value for this variable is only observed for those unemployed that find a job one year after. 
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Table 1.2 (continued): Descriptive Statistics by country and gender 
  Spain  Portugal 
  Female  Male  Female  Male 
Variable  Mean  Std.  
Dev.  Mean  Std.  
Dev.  Mean  Std.  
Dev.  Mean  Std. 
 Dev. 
                 
Ln (reservation wage) (€ PPP)  1.37  0.34  1.44  0.32  0.99  0.35  1.12  0.41 
Ln (months unemployed)  2.75  1.46  2.33  1.42  2.65  1.35  2.26  1.25 
Desired working hours  39.14  5.86  40.91  5.41  39.48  4.38  40.19  3.76 
Age group:                 
Age 25-29  0.31  0.46  0.29  0.45  0.21  0.41  0.20  0.40 
Age 30-34  0.18  0.38  0.19  0.40  0.17  0.37  0.12  0.32 
Age 35-39  0.04  0.19  0.04  0.19  0.06  0.24  0.02  0.15 
Married or living with partner  0.30  0.46  0.23  0.42  0.48  0.50  0.19  0.39 
Education level:                 
Upper secondary education  0.24  0.43  0.23  0.42  0.21  0.40  0.18  0.38 
Higher education or equivalent  0.28  0.45  0.17  0.37  0.05  0.21  0.03  0.18 
Living with parents  0.70  0.46  0.80  0.40  0.60  0.49  0.85  0.36 
Number of children aged 5 or less  0.16  0.42  0.14  0.41  0.29  0.52  0.13  0.44 
Number of children aged 6-14  0.29  0.62  0.28  0.64  0.50  0.88  0.42  0.85 
Net family income 10
3 €  16.72  15.74  15.48  12.79  12.63  8.67  13.65  10.84 
Unemployment benefits dummy  0.19  0.39  0.22  0.41  0.15  0.36  0.09  0.29 
Household members at work  1.04  0.90  0.99  0.95  1.48  0.95  1.49  1.00 
Regional unemployment:                 
Regional unemployment rate as at the interview date  29.06  5.53  16.57  4.15  8.50  2.81  6.08  2.88 
Regional unemployment rate when started as unemployed  27.60  4.89  16.95  4.34  8.48  2.56  6.25  2.69 
Unemployment rate imputation  0.01  0.08  0.03  0.17  0.10  0.29  0.05  0.22 
Actual wage (t+1)  4.96  2.22  5.24  2.09  2.98  1.51  3.26  1.30 
Year dummies:                 
Year 1996  0.19  0.39  0.22  0.42  0.17  0.38  0.18  0.38 
Year 1997  0.17  0.37  0.18  0.38  0.18  0.38  0.16  0.36 
Year 1998  0.13  0.34  0.14  0.35  0.17  0.38  0.15  0.35 
Year 1999  0.12  0.33  0.10  0.30  0.14  0.35  0.13  0.34 
Year 2000  0.11  0.31  0.09  0.29  0.08  0.27  0.10  0.31 
Year 2001  0.09  0.29  0.07  0.26  0.10  0.30  0.08  0.27 
         
Observations  2490  2088  769  459 
* The value for this variable is only observed for those unemployed that find a job one year after. 
Source: Author's own calculations from ECHP 1995-2001 (sample restricted to unemployed people). 
 
The  important  differences  between  Portugal  and  the  rest  of  Southern  European 
countries coming out from the unconditioned figures may be on the basis of some of the 
results we have withdrawn from the econometric approach undertaken. Thus, we will pay 
more attention to these potential differences in section 5. 
Before discussing the results of the empirical approach we will give, in the next 
subsection, a general overview on the labour market institutional framework involved in 
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4.1. Institutional framework 
The institutional framework in Southern European countries is defined by three main 
pillars: first of all, a weak connection between the education system
23 and the employment 
system, with a low incidence of apprenticeships and vocational training schemes that hinder 
quick or smooth entry into the labour market and end up (with the exception of Portugal) in 
long initial search processes in the labour market. The second pillar is the scarce generosity 
of the unemployment system, with a strong insurance component and a residual assistance 
component. Table B2 (Appendix B) gathers information from Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 of the 
OECD  Benefits  and  Wages  2002  report.  For  the  sake  of  comparison,  given  that 
unemployment benefits outcomes vary across family composition, the information in the 
table only applies to a 40-year-old worker without children, with 18 years of unemployment 
records and previously earning average income. The level of protection for unemployment is 
relatively  exigent  with  the  requirements  of  contributions  to  social  security  before  the 
unemployment  spell  occurs  and  is  far  less  generous  in  terms  of  quantity  of  benefits 
compared  to  other  systems  in  central  (i.e.  France,  Germany)  and  Northern  European 
countries (i.e., Finland and Sweden).  
The third pillar in the institutional framework is the strong traditional regulation of 
labour markets with protection to employment and restrictions to hire under temporary basis 
and part-time basis. Related to this are the recent reforms, mostly during the late eighties and 
nineties,  enhancing  flexibility  at  the  margin  of  the  labour  market,  this  is,  making  more 
flexible  arrangements  for  new  comers  and  temporary  (marginal)  workers  and  leaving 
untouched the core group of workers (permanent), with dismissal costs for the latter not 
being in the collective bargaining agenda.  
These main features of the labour market will help us to explain some of the results 
we have found in the empirical approach presented in next section. 
 
5.  The Empirical Results 
5.1. Determinants of the reservation wages 
A previous issue before going in depth into the results of the first set of estimates 
(those focused on the reservation wage equations) is that of the incidence of non-response to 
reservation wages. In our dataset this rate is below 13%. Although it cannot be considered as 
a particularly high non-response rate, we have tried to check whether there is a pattern in 
                                                 
23 For example, in Spain, Italy and Greece, the participation in continuous vocational training is lowest. So, 
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non-response to this question, as in Prasad (2003)
24. Given that reservation wages may be 
taken as a sensitive question, there might be certain groups more likely to avoid answering 
that question than others are. We have tested several instruments
25 in order to control for the 
potential endogeneity that this selection bias produces. The tests for this plausible selection 
problem are available from the authors upon request, but none of them showed a significant 
selection as regards this variable.  
An additional key question in this type of empirical approaches relates to how to take 
into account that, due to the wording of the questions in the survey, the stated reservation 
wage is conditioned on the reported number of expected working hours. There are three 
possible alternatives to face this problem.  We can  transform the reservation wage to an 
hourly  reservation  wage,  or  include  the  number  of  expected  hours  of  work  among  the 
regressors, or both. Appendix C presents a brief and not exhaustive discussion about the 
consequences of adopting any of these alternatives, by replicating the arguments held by 
Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001). The results stated henceforth rely on hourly reservation 
wages as dependent variable, excluding expected (desired) working hours as regressor.  
As  a  consequence  of  the  differences  revealed  by  the  descriptive  statistics  the 
regressions are performed by gender and country. We report two different specifications in 
order to control the problems stemming from the possible correlation between number of 
workers in the household and household incomes (specification II seems to be the most 
satisfactory).  
In Tables 2.1 and 2.2 we present the results of these specifications for the reservation 
wage equation.  
Table 2.1 shows that reservation wages are higher for “older workers”
26. This could 
reflect  that  age  may  be  taken  as  a  proxy  for  experience  in  the  labour  market  and, 
consequently,  the  positive  value  of  the  age  group  coefficients  should  be  consider  as  a 
measure of the premium associated to higher experience levels. 
                                                 
24 Prasad found a non-response rate of over 25% for the reservation wage question due to the particular way in 
which the question was made in the German Socioeconomic Panel: respondents were given the possibility to 
answer “I do not know”, which is an option not available in the ECHP. 
25 The instruments that have been tested are the number of individuals interviewed in a house as a potential 
control for the eventual tiredness of the interviewer; the length of the interview, to control for relative attention 
paid by the interviewee; the method of interviewing, since face to face interviews could hinder direct and 
sincere  answers  from  individuals;  and  whether  there  was  somebody  else  present  when  the  interview  was 
completed, for the same reason: privacy should enhance answers to sensitive questions. None of them have a 
high explanatory power. 
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Marital status is only significant for unemployed men. This may respond to the fact 
that marital status is more connected to being the head of the household for men than for 
women,  which  means  a  stronger  pressure  for  men  to  get  a  higher  wage  if  married. 
Nevertheless this coefficient is only significant for Spain, when separated regressions by 
country are undertaken (Table 2.2). 
Obviously higher educational levels make the individual more demanding in terms of 
reservation wages, as one of the main reasons to invest in education is to get higher earnings. 
To be precise, for university graduates reservation wages are about 19% (17.7% for men and 
20.0% for women) higher than for workers with only general schooling, controlling for other 
characteristics. These figures are almost threefold in the case of Portuguese unemployed, 
probably as a result of the scarce proportion of individuals with higher education in this 
country. 
Living with parents is much less relevant, to explain reservation wages, for women 
than for men, and becomes insignificant for women when the number of household members 
at work is controlled for. A potential reason for this is that the experience of unemployment 
is far more related amongst (young) men to remaining in the parental home, whereas in the 
case of women this is not necessarily the case. In other words, men, unlike women, probably 
consider finding a job as a way of leaving parents home and, possibly, a way of living their 
own lives. 
Having kids aged 5 or younger does not show any significance in the determination 
of reservation wages. An explanation for this lack of significance is the potential confluence 
of two driving forces in opposite direction: if a person looks after young offsprings in a 
household, (s)he might be more demanding with the available options in the market given 
that (s)he has a time constraint in his/her supply of labour. This means a rise in his/her 
reservation wage. But, at the same time, if there were children, and if there were an array of 
people at home who could do that, the one who would eventually devote time to this task 
would be the one whose time is less valuable in the market, and therefore the one whose 
reservation wage is lower.  
Conversely, the presence of children aged 6-14 shows statistically significant impact 
upon the determination of the reservation wages, and there seems to be differences between 
men  and  women  as  regards  this.  In  fact,  this  variable  has  smaller  effect  on  women 
reservation wage than on men’s. This reflects the contrasting nature of the relation between 
labour  supply  and  the  presence  of  children  amongst  these  groups.  In  the  case  of  men, 
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return to expending more time looking for a job, so that reduces reservation wages and 
forces quicker acceptance of job offers. But for women, following our previous argument, 
the  presence  of  children  is  not  only  an  economic  burden  but  also  a  constraint  in  the 
allocation of time for the labour market and ends up in a lower decrease of reservation wage. 
Summarizing, substantial degree of specialization still persist between men and women in 
family life. 
A central result arising from our estimates of the reservation wage equation is that for 
the  unemployment  benefits  dummy  variable, as  it is  much  more  relevant  in the  case  of 
women than men. If we take reservation wages as a proxy of the individual’s restrictions to 
accept a job, we should assert that unemployment benefits acts as a clear disincentive, in the 
case of women, to accept any job and in this sense would promote job market frictions.   
Moreover this correlation holds when regressions by countries are conducted (Table 
2.2), except for Portugal that states a somewhat peculiar result. A plausible explanation is the 
well  known  nominal  wage  flexibility  in  this  country,  which  contrasts  with  the  overall 
regulation of the labour market; likewise, the unemployment benefits are less generous than 
in the rest of the countries under evaluation. 
Agents  in  households  with  higher  levels  of  wealth  might  have  better  access  to 
financial instruments to insure against labor income risk and would, therefore, tend to have 
higher  reservation  wages.  In  other  words,  unemployed  in  wealthier  families  tend  to  be 
choosier when looking for a job. However, strong social networks among wealthy people 
provide a way of getting higher arrival rate of job offers which would counterbalance the 
former effect (Rendon, 2004) and would end simultaneously in a higher reservation wage 
and  a  shorter  unemployment  spell.  Our  results  support  this  argument  but  in  the case  of 
Greece, which coefficient for this variable is insignificant although still positive.  
As above mentioned we have tested several specifications for approaching household 
income. Apart from the per capita (OECD scale corrected) household income we have tested 
the explanatory power of the number of employed adults in the household (specification II). 
The effect of this variable is not significant for men but significant and negative for women. 
In the case of men the effect of number of employed people in the household is stronger than 
for the income variable, since the former is a proxy for both income and social networks. 
The surprising behavior of this variable amongst women may be due to that, in a household 
with several employed people, men get profit of more employment opportunities, potentially 
due to the social networks the employed household members provide. For women the effect 




























  16 
production if they are the “less valuable person” (i.e. get less wage) in the labour market. 
These results provide additional support to the above mentioned argument on the substantial 
degree of specialization that still persist between men and women in household production. 
Additional control variables for the reservation wage equation include year dummy 
variables and a flag dummy variable intended to capture that for a few regions with missing 
unemployment rate we imputed the national unemployment rate.   
 
Table 2.1: Determinants of the Reservation wages, all countries 
  Specification I  Specification II 
  Both  Female  Male  Both  Female  Male 
Female=1  -0.094***      -0.093***     
  (0.009)      (0.009)     
Age group:             
Age 25-29  0.055***  0.052***  0.057***  0.051***  0.047***  0.056*** 
  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
Age 30-34  0.078***  0.083***  0.069***  0.072***  0.073***  0.067*** 
  (0.011)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.017)  (0.016) 
Age 35-39  0.076***  0.082**  0.063**  0.068***  0.070**  0.060** 
  (0.022)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.022)  (0.032)  (0.027) 
Married or living with partner  0.029*  0.020  0.053**  0.033**  0.029  0.054** 
  (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.023) 
Educational level:             
Upper secondary education  0.052***  0.065***  0.034***  0.051***  0.065***  0.033*** 
  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
Higher education or equivalent  0.188***  0.200***  0.177***  0.187***  0.199***  0.176*** 
  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.022) 
Living with parents  -0.050***  -0.038*  -0.077***  -0.046***  -0.029  -0.076*** 
  (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
Number of children aged 5 or less   -0.008  -0.009  -0.014  -0.009  -0.010  -0.014 
  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.015) 
Number of children aged 6-14  -0.027***  -0.020**  -0.038***  -0.026***  -0.019**  -0.038*** 
  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Net Family income/1000  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.003***  0.002***  0.003*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Unemployment benefits dummy  0.028***  0.042***  0.007  0.028***  0.043***  0.002** 
  (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.004)  (0.017)  (0.001) 
Regional unemployment rate  0.001**  0.001  0.002**  0.001**  0.000  0.002** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Year dummy variables  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Country:              
Italy  0.316***  0.335***  0.294***  0.316***  0.335***  0.294*** 
  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Greece  0.010  0.004  0.019  0.013  0.008  0.020 
  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.025)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.025) 
Portugal  -0.294***  -0.324***  -0.250***  -0.288***  -0.316***  -0.247*** 
  (0.017)  (0.022)  (0.025)  (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.025) 
Household members at work        -0.015***  -0.024***  -0.006 
        (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Constant  1.295***  1.195***  1.318***  1.302***  1.210***  1.321*** 
  (0.020)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.020)  (0.030)  (0.030) 
Observations  14073  7617  6456  14073  7617  6456 
R
2  0.27  0.29  0.24  0.27  0.29  0.24 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the hourly reservation wage. 
Baseline category: Age 16-24, less than upper secondary education, single, widow or divorced, living away from 
parents’ home, no children, Spain. 
Year dummy variables are included and a flag variable for imputed values in the regional unemployment variable. 




























  17 
Table 2.2: Determinants of the Reservation Wages, by country 
  Italy  Greece 
  Specification I  Specification II  Specification I  Specification II 
  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male 
Age group:                 
Age 25-29  0.029*  0.034**  0.025  0.034**  0.053  0.066  0.049  0.068 
  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.034)  (0.051)  (0.033)  (0.051) 
Age 30-34  0.018  0.059***  0.011  0.059***  0.191***  0.137**  0.178***  0.144** 
  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.064)  (0.062)  (0.063)  (0.062) 
Age 35-39  0.014  0.055  0.006  0.054  0.235*  -0.005  0.217  0.003 
  (0.038)  (0.044)  (0.039)  (0.045)  (0.137)  (0.086)  (0.136)  (0.086) 
Married or living with partner  0.032  0.002  0.035  0.002  -0.083  0.029  -0.072  0.028 
  (0.034)  (0.036)  (0.034)  (0.036)  (0.072)  (0.094)  (0.072)  (0.094) 
Educational level:                 
Upper secondary education  0.073***  0.030**  0.071***  0.030**  0.008  -0.010  0.010  -0.011 
  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.036)  (0.053)  (0.036)  (0.053) 
Higher education or equivalent  0.295***  0.251***  0.292***  0.251***  0.132***  0.166*  0.129***  0.167** 
  (0.032)  (0.041)  (0.032)  (0.041)  (0.045)  (0.085)  (0.046)  (0.085) 
Living with parents  -0.017  -0.052  -0.016  -0.052  -0.048  -0.072  -0.029  -0.074 
  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.034)  (0.032)  (0.068)  (0.075)  (0.070)  (0.075) 
Number of children aged <5  0.010  -0.005  0.010  -0.005  -0.001  0.024  -0.000  0.025 
  (0.017)  (0.026)  (0.017)  (0.026)  (0.044)  (0.061)  (0.044)  (0.062) 
Number of children aged 6-14  -0.011  -0.026*  -0.011  -0.026*  0.009  -0.062  0.009  -0.064 
  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.033)  (0.043)  (0.032)  (0.044) 
Net Family income/1000  0.001*  0.002***  0.002***  0.002**  0.001  0.003  0.001  0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Unemployment benefits dummy  0.029**  -0.036  0.031**  -0.036  0.052  0.010  0.052  0.011 
  (0.013)  (0.036)  (0.012)  (0.036)  (0.063)  (0.059)  (0.062)  (0.059) 
Regional unemployment rate  0.002***  0.003**  0.002***  0.003**  0.000  0.019  -0.001  0.019 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.006)  (0.013) 
Year dummy variables  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
                 
Household members at work      -0.016*  -0.002      -0.033*  0.014 
      (0.009)  (0.009)      (0.019)  (0.022) 
Constant  1.501***  1.622***  1.512***  1.623***  1.263***  1.187***  1.298***  1.178*** 
  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.118)  (0.121)  (0.117)  (0.121) 
Observations  2867  2996  2867  2996  1491  913  1491  913 
R
2  0.10  0.07  0.10  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.06 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the hourly reservation wage. OLS estimates. 
Baseline category: Age 16-24, less than upper secondary education, single, widow or divorced, living away from parents’ 
home, no children. 
Year dummy variables and a flag variable for imputed values in the regional unemployment variable are included. 
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Table 2.2 (continued): Determinants of the Reservation Wages, by country 
  Spain  Portugal 
  Specification I  Specification II  Specification I  Specification II 
  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male 
Age group:                 
Age 25-29  0.060***  0.074***  0.054***  0.072***  0.068*  0.179**  0.058  0.178** 
  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.037)  (0.071)  (0.037)  (0.070) 
Age 30-34  0.065***  0.054**  0.052**  0.050**  0.115***  0.116**  0.102***  0.114** 
  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.040)  (0.052)  (0.039)  (0.052) 
Age 35-39  0.058  0.077**  0.043  0.070*  0.126***  0.145  0.115***  0.143 
  (0.043)  (0.036)  (0.043)  (0.037)  (0.042)  (0.117)  (0.041)  (0.118) 
Married or living with partner  0.094***  0.110***  0.105***  0.110***  -0.039  0.051  -0.030  0.053 
  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.028)  (0.054)  (0.028)  (0.054) 
Educational level:                 
Upper secondary education  0.063***  0.040**  0.065***  0.040**  0.171***  0.200***  0.165***  0.200*** 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.031)  (0.059)  (0.030)  (0.059) 
Higher education or equivalent  0.155***  0.109***  0.157***  0.108***  0.665***  0.647***  0.660***  0.645*** 
  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.064)  (0.100)  (0.063)  (0.100) 
Living with parents  -0.020  -0.070**  -0.009  -0.068**  -0.084***  -0.180***  -0.063*  -0.177*** 
  (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.032)  (0.054)  (0.032)  (0.054) 
Number of children aged 5 or less   0.012  -0.018  0.011  -0.018  -0.024  -0.067*  -0.026  -0.068* 
  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.035)  (0.024)  (0.035) 
Number of children aged 6-14  -0.036***  -0.043***  -0.033***  -0.041***  -0.022*  -0.005  -0.021*  -0.005 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.015) 
Net Family income/1000  0.002***  0.002**  0.003***  0.002***  0.005***  0.008***  0.006***  0.008*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Unemployment benefits dummy  0.032**  0.017  0.030**  0.016*  0.006  -0.087**  -0.031***  -0.004 
  (0.013)  (0.017)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.031)  (0.041)  (0.012)  (0.021) 
Regional unemployment rate  -0.004***  -0.003  -0.005***  -0.003*  0.017**  0.024***  0.016**  0.024*** 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Year dummy variables  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
                 
Household members at work      -0.027***  -0.017*      -0.031***  -0.006 
      (0.009)  (0.009)      (0.012)  (0.022) 
Constant  1.297***  1.375***  1.318***  1.387***  0.785***  0.936***  0.807***  0.940*** 
  (0.051)  (0.043)  (0.051)  (0.044)  (0.061)  (0.096)  (0.062)  (0.093) 
Observations  2490  2088  2490  2088  769  459  769  459 
R
2  0.15  0.14  0.15  0.15  0.28  0.31  0.28  0.31 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the hourly reservation wage. OLS estimates. 
Baseline category: Age 16-24, less than upper secondary education, single, widow or divorced, living away from parents’ 
home, no children. 
Year dummy variables and a flag variable for imputed values in the regional unemployment variable are included. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
The goodness of fit (R
2) achieved in the estimation of reservation wages oscillates 
across specifications, but is always above 24%. This appears reasonable, given the subjective 
nature of the dependent variable and that when earning functions are estimated for actual 
wages, the R
2 get not much higher values (between 30% and 45%).  
As far as differences across countries are concerned, reservation wages in Italy are 
shown  to  be  higher,  everything  else  constant, than  in  Spain; the  Portuguese  register  the 
lowest ones. This is perfectly consistent with the pattern of expected wages in these labour 
markets, with Portugal being the country where lower wages are achieved and, amongst 
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5.2. Determinants of the unemployment duration 
To gain insights into the main factors affecting elapsed unemployment duration of 
young Southern-European workers we present Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
An important lesson we have learnt from the first part of the econometric results 
(section 5.1) is that unemployment benefits dummy variable appear to be a weak instrument 
for reservation wages when men are examined. That is why we additionally include net 
family incomes (excluding worker’s own incomes) as instrument for reservation wages when 
we analyze, in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the effect of reservation wages in the unemployment 
duration equation.  
Following Hui (1991), these tables report the results coming out from OLS and 2SLS 
instrumental variable estimates of the determinants of unemployment duration. 
 
Table 3.1: OLS and IV estimates of the Unemployment duration (months), all countries 
  OLS – Specification I  OLS – Specification II  IV – Specification II 
  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male 
Ln (Hourly reservation wage)      -0.021  -0.105*  -0.837  -0.607 
      (0.044)  (0.055)  (0.676)  (0.772) 
Age groups  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Married or living with partner  -0.144*  -0.293***  -0.136*  -0.216**  -0.103  -0.190* 
  (0.076)  (0.091)  (0.081)  (0.097)  (0.088)  (0.111) 
Educational level:             
Upper secondary education  -0.271***  -0.142***  -0.313***  -0.114**  -0.255***  -0.079 
  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.067)  (0.060) 
Higher education or equivalent  -0.612***  -0.399***  -0.658***  -0.347***  -0.489***  -0.246 
  (0.060)  (0.070)  (0.063)  (0.073)  (0.150)  (0.160) 
Living with parents  0.341***  0.338***  0.295***  0.324***  0.302***  0.378*** 
  (0.076)  (0.086)  (0.082)  (0.093)  (0.087)  (0.100) 
Number of children aged 5 or less  0.076  0.004  0.081  -0.007  0.080  0.011 
  (0.055)  (0.072)  (0.063)  (0.077)  (0.063)  (0.080) 
Number of children aged 6-14  -0.048  -0.017  -0.073*  -0.030  -0.086**  -0.053 
  (0.036)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.053) 
Regional unemployment rate  0.039***  0.052***  0.035***  0.051***  0.035***  0.051*** 
  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Year dummy variables  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Country:             
Italy  1.009***  1.423***  1.002***  1.467***  1.257***  1.591*** 
  (0.053)  (0.051)  (0.058)  (0.056)  (0.232)  (0.232) 
Greece  0.904***  1.044***  0.878***  1.124***  0.871***  1.109*** 
  (0.075)  (0.089)  (0.078)  (0.092)  (0.080)  (0.093) 
Portugal  0.662***  0.522***  0.540***  0.442***  0.255  0.309 
  (0.099)  (0.092)  (0.105)  (0.099)  (0.249)  (0.224) 
Constant  1.535***  1.254***  1.760***  1.396***  2.737***  2.008* 
  (0.130)  (0.136)  (0.146)  (0.162)  (0.842)  (1.039) 
Observations  7787  6464  6797  5742  6697  5607 
F
a          36.87***  53.07*** 
R
2  0.16  0.22  0.16  0.22     
These notes apply to Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 
Note 
a: R
2 has not a real statistical meaning in the context of 2SLS/IV, that is why F is reported for IV regressions. 
The  dependent  variable  is  the  logarithm  of  the  amount  of  months  unemployed.  Last  two  columns  report 
Instrumental Variable estimations using Net Family incomes and Unemployment benefits dummy as instruments. 
Baseline category: Age 16-24, less than upper secondary education, single, widow or divorced, living away from 
parents’  home,  no  children.  Year  dummy  variables  and  a  flag  variable  for  imputed  values  in  the  regional 
unemployment variable are included. 
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To  conserve  space  we  will  only  focus  on  the  main  results,  especially  those 
concerning  the  differences  between  instrumental  and  non-instrumental  estimates  of  the 
unemployment duration equation.  
Because both reservation wages and unemployment are in logs, β is the elasticity of 
unemployment  duration  with  respect  to  reservation  wages.  Specifically  the  coefficient 
computed for men, in Table 3.1 (OLS-specification II), means that a 1% increase in hourly 
reservation  wages  decrease  the  unemployment  duration  by  0.1%,  although  the  statistical 
correlation is pretty weak (significant only at 10%) for men and not significant at all for 
female workers. What is more, the effect of hourly reservation wages on unemployment 
duration  disappears  when  the  former  is  instrumented.  The  same  hold  when  results 
distinguishing by country are investigated. Thus, reservation wages do not appear as a key 
factor to explain unemployment duration, at least for young workers living in South-Europe. 
What is more, this lack of correlation does not seem to be due to the potential endogeneity of 
reservation wages to unemployment duration, as the instrumental estimates do not give any 
support to this.  
In this sense we cannot establish a clear correlation between unemployment benefits, 
reservation wages and unemployment duration unlike some of the literature published for 
other countries. 
Regarding with the rest of variables, the variable “living with parents” state, for men, 
a positive and statistically significant correlation with unemployment duration, however this 
regressor showed a negative sign when reservation wages were analysed (Table 2.1). This is 
opposite to what the literature usually report, i.e. increasing reservation wages translates into 
higher  unemployment  duration  and  vice  versa.  Similarly  when  the  variable  “married  or 
living with partner” is evaluated we found a positive correlation with reservation wages and 
negative with unemployment duration. These results may help to explain why reservation 
wages  and  unemployment  duration  do  not  keep  in  our  results  the  commonly  stated 
correlation;  particularly,  we  do  not  find  evidence  supporting  the  optimal  search  theory, 
which predicts a positive correlation between both variables. 
The education coefficients are to some extent striking. Although they are negative, 
implying that the time taken to find a job is shorter for those with higher levels of schooling, 
the coefficients of the upper secondary and higher education variables turns insignificant for 
men when the instrumental variable procedure is conducted. The lack of more disaggregated 
information on the level of education makes difficult to give a consistent explanation to this, 
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Turning to the regional unemployment rate variable we have to emphasize that the 
evidence about the relationship of local unemployment rates, individuals’ reservation wages 
and duration of search for a job if unemployed is scarce and assorted. For example, Haurin & 
Sridhar (2003) analyses data for USA (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) to test whether 
relatively high local unemployment rates reduce the reservation wages of area residents or 
increase the duration of search. They found no evidence that local unemployment rates affect 
either reservation wages or the duration of search. The results achieved in our regressions are 
rather ambiguous as well. In general we find that higher regional unemployment rates reduce 
the reservation wages of Spanish unemployed but, conversely, increase the reservation wage 
of Italian and Portuguese workers. The results for the latter look counterintuitive. In order to 
explain this, we have to keep in mind that unemployment rates may not be measured with 
enough precision, as the ECHP states the individuals’ location at a substantial aggregated 
level. On the other hand, when analysing the effect of this regressor on the unemployment 
duration the sign of the corresponding coefficient is positive
27, that is the kind of result that 
any previous intuition would confirm. 
 
Table 3.2: OLS and IV estimates of the Unemployment duration (months), by country 
  Italy  Greece 
  OLS – Specification II  IV – Specification II  OLS – Specification II  IV – Specification II 
  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male 
Ln (Hourly reservation wage)  0.103  0.059  -1.068  0.628  0.185***  0.016  -1.483  0.634 
  (0.077)  (0.082)  (1.852)  (1.375)  (0.066)  (0.091)  (2.657)  (0.796) 
Age groups  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Married or living with partner  0.122  0.006  0.185  -0.004  -0.078  -0.472*  -0.891  -0.496 
  (0.132)  (0.163)  (0.154)  (0.179)  (0.169)  (0.277)  (2.011)  (0.681) 
Educational level:                 
Upper secondary education  -0.598***  -0.266***  -0.506***  -0.275***  -0.063  0.134  -0.119  0.180 
  (0.069)  (0.066)  (0.160)  (0.093)  (0.135)  (0.134)  (0.736)  (0.378) 
Higher education or equivalent  -1.256***  -1.064***  -0.893  -1.215***  -0.301*  0.309*  1.693  -0.476 
  (0.116)  (0.130)  (0.576)  (0.407)  (0.157)  (0.168)  (2.586)  (1.077) 
Living with parents  0.334**  0.482***  0.396***  0.671***  0.290  0.436*  -0.671  0.736 
  (0.135)  (0.145)  (0.145)  (0.171)  (0.182)  (0.229)  (1.925)  (0.585) 
Number of children aged 5 or less  -0.082  -0.126  -0.055  -0.095  0.011  -0.280  -0.021  -0.249 
  (0.114)  (0.141)  (0.115)  (0.149)  (0.154)  (0.226)  (0.909)  (0.465) 
Number of children aged 6-14  -0.173**  -0.135*  -0.185**  -0.105  -0.205**  -0.015  0.187  0.311 
  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.095)  (0.134)  (0.800)  (0.468) 
Regional unemployment rate  0.040***  0.081***  0.043***  0.078***  0.032  -0.001  0.021  -0.225 
  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.028)  (0.039)  (0.130)  (0.317) 
Year dummy variables  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
                 
Constant  2.338***  1.949***  4.040  0.859  2.044***  2.267***  26.456  -4.844 
  (0.211)  (0.229)  (2.834)  (2.271)  (0.456)  (0.385)  (30.131)  (8.453) 
Observations  2599  2707  2527  2599  1317  790  1310  777 
F
a      9.87***  14.26***      3.06***  3.46*** 
R
2  0.18  0.13      0.05  0.12     
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Table 3.2 (continued): OLS and IV estimates of the Unemployment duration (months), by country 
  Spain  Portugal 
  OLS – Specification II  IV – Specification II  OLS – Specification II  IV – Specification II 
  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female  Male 
Ln (Hourly reservation wage)  -0.282***  -0.460***  -1.287  2.099  -0.374**  0.110  0.376  0.737 
  (0.098)  (0.114)  (1.024)  (2.251)  (0.172)  (0.173)  (1.516)  (0.841) 
Age groups  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Married or living with partner  -0.096  -0.243*  0.009  -0.538*  -0.351**  -0.394**  -0.340*  -0.441** 
  (0.157)  (0.139)  (0.200)  (0.313)  (0.173)  (0.186)  (0.193)  (0.197) 
Educational level:                 
Upper secondary education  -0.181**  -0.014  -0.113  -0.134  -0.105  0.295*  -0.254  0.172 
  (0.090)  (0.088)  (0.118)  (0.139)  (0.127)  (0.171)  (0.305)  (0.236) 
Higher education or equival.  -0.516***  -0.065  -0.361**  -0.336  -0.046  -0.474  -0.713  -0.968 
  (0.095)  (0.105)  (0.183)  (0.270)  (0.260)  (0.334)  (1.077)  (0.763) 
Living with parents  0.346**  0.178  0.338**  0.272  0.271  0.139  0.343*  0.209 
  (0.151)  (0.133)  (0.155)  (0.174)  (0.177)  (0.189)  (0.199)  (0.223) 
Number of children aged 5 or 
less  0.214**  0.140  0.221**  0.192  0.085  0.090  0.124  0.142 
  (0.091)  (0.100)  (0.092)  (0.132)  (0.144)  (0.157)  (0.156)  (0.176) 
Number of children aged 6-14  -0.063  0.019  -0.106  0.133  0.141**  0.028  0.164**  0.036 
  (0.062)  (0.057)  (0.076)  (0.135)  (0.065)  (0.077)  (0.075)  (0.077) 
Regional unemployment rate  0.013  0.019**  0.009  0.027**  0.039  -0.102***  0.027  -0.119*** 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.042)  (0.036) 
Year dummy variables  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
                 
Constant  2.793***  2.676***  4.091***  -0.842  2.978***  2.964***  2.338*  2.364*** 
  (0.301)  (0.271)  (1.340)  (3.101)  (0.348)  (0.336)  (1.255)  (0.853) 
Observations  2163  1817  2148  1804  718  428  713  427 
F
a      10.28***  3.85***      4.58***  4.15*** 
R2  0.10  0.06      0.11  0.15     
 
5.3. Reservation wages - actual wages 
To  conclude  this  section  we  briefly  examine  the  correlation  between  reported 
reservation wages and actual earnings. To some extent this may be considered a test to 
validate the quality of the reservation wage data.  
We  compute  the  fitted  accepted  hourly  wages  (t+1)  using  a  selection  corrected 
Mincerian-type earnings specification. To be precise we use Heckman’s two steps procedure 
to correct for the potential selection bias. In the selection equation we include employed and 
non-employed workers, but the earnings equation is estimated only for workers who report 
earnings on full-time job in the year after the reservation wage was observed
28.  
Similarly  we  estimated  predicted  values  for  desired  wages  (t)  by  using  a  simple 
Mincerian-type earnings equation. 
The  quantiles  of  the  predicted  values  for  desired  wages  are  plotted  against  the 
quantiles of the fitted values for accepted wages (offer wages) in Figure 1, distinguishing by 
country. 
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This plot reveals substantial differences among countries in the correlation between 
fitted desired and offered wages. Low(high)-paid workers in Greece and Portugal reported 
that the minimum net hourly wage they would accept to work is higher(lower) that the one 
actually achieved one year after. However Italian and Spaniards get wages superior to the 
ones they expected when they were asked about the reservation wage. Consequently, it looks 
like  in  countries  where  the  offered  wages  are  lower,  the  worst  paid  workers  are  less 
‘realistic’ in terms of the wage that they are capable to accept.  
In other words, in Portugal and Greece the sign of  the gap between desired and 
accepted wages depend on the tail of the wage offer distribution we are analysing. This has 
implications in terms of labor market policies. From the labor supply standpoint, it implies 
that many low skill workers would not accept the actual hourly wages offered in the labor 
market. However attending to the results presented in section 5.1 the solution to this problem 
does not seem to rely on changes in the unemployment protection system. On the other hand 
this may be a direct consequence of ineffective labor demand policies that have been unable 
to  reduce  the  wage  rigidities,  forcing  low-skilled  workers  (mainly)  to  work  for  too  low 
wages. 
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6.  Conclusions 
We  have  undertaken  an  empirical  approach  combining  OLS  and  instrumental 
variables  techniques  to  assess  the  influence  of  a  comprehensive  array  of  personal  and 
background characteristics on the reservation wage and the duration of unemployment.  
The results drawn from the reservation wage equations would suggest that the only 
factors substantially affecting this variable across the whole four countries, and genders, are 
formal education and net family incomes;  more interestingly the unemployment benefits 
dummy variable is only relevant in the case of young women. If we take reservation wages 
as  a  proxy  of  the  individual’s  restrictions  to  accept  a  job,  we  should  assert  that 
unemployment benefits acts as a clear disincentive, in the case of women, to accept any job 
and in this sense would promote some job market frictions (but in Portugal).   
However the correlation between reservation wages and unemployment duration is 
pretty weak (significant only at 10%) for men and not significant at all for female workers. 
What is more, the effect of hourly reservation wages on unemployment duration disappears 
when the former is instrumented. The same hold when results distinguishing by country are 
investigated. Thus, reservation wages do not appear as a key factor to explain unemployment 
duration,  at  least  for  young  workers  living  in  South-Europe.  Consequently  we  cannot 
establish  a  clear  correlation  between  unemployment  benefits,  reservation  wages  and 
unemployment duration unlike some of the literature published for other countries.  
Summarising, we do not find evidence supporting the optimal search theory, which 
predicts a positive correlation between reservation wages and unemployment duration. This 
does not result striking, as we did not expect the optimal search hypotheses to apply in 
Southern labour markets, which are stagnant, highly regulated and with low rate of arrivals 
of job offers. 
Although  differences  in  labor  market  legislations  and  data  measurement  errors 
could  be  part  of  the  story,  more  research  is  required  to  identify  better  instruments  for 
reservation wages on the unemployment duration equation. At least that is what we conclude 
after  checking  that  using  instrumental  variable  estimates  to  correct  for  the  possible 
endogeneity of reservation wages on unemployment duration does not make a significant 
difference as far as the coefficients are concerned. 
Regarding with the differences found for female and male unemployed our results 
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family life. Thus, any policy aimed at reducing unemployment duration has to take into 
account the general lack of corresponsability in family tasks. 
Finally, we investigated the possible correlation between the distribution of fitted 
desired and accepted wages. The results showed that in countries where the offered wages 
are lower, the worst paid workers are less ‘realistic’ in terms of the wage that they are 
capable to accept. In other words, substantial rigidities still persist both from the supply and 
demand labor market side.  
Studies like the one presented here seem to be of special interest in any research 
agenda aimed at disentangling the common trends in the European Union labor market, more 
than ever in a context of increasing legislation designed to affect the European Union as a 
whole. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1: Average number of working hours during the period 1995-2001 
  Private Sector  Public Sector 
  Male  Female  Total  Male  Female  Total 
Italy  43.7  37.9  41.8  37.2  32.0  34.8 
Greece  48.1  40.5  45.4  40.1  35.0  38.1 
Spain  45.6  40.0  44.1  40.4  36.8  38.8 
Portugal  43.5  41.7  40.3  40.8  36.0  38.2 
      Source: Author's own calculations from ECHP 1995-2001. 
 
Table B2: Institutional framework 




125 days in 14 
months  52 weeks in 2 years  540 days in 2 years  12 months in 6 
years 
Waiting period  6 days  7 days  -  - 
Payment rate (%)  40  80  65  70 (60 after 6 m) 
Minimum benefit (€ PPP)      € 5033.14  €5276.33 
Maximum benefit (€ PPP)  € 9315.45  € 12260.02  € 9814.62  € 11959.70 
Duration (months)  12  6  30  24 
Unemployment Assistance 
Employment condition  Exhausting UB  - 
Exhausting UB or 
insufficient 
contributions 
Exhausting UB or 
insufficient 
contributions 
Income (assets) test  Family income  -  Individual income  Family income 
Waiting period  -  -  -  - 
Duration (months)  -  -  24  18 
Payment rate (%)  17% of UB  -  Flat rate  Flat rate 
Minimum benefit (€ PPP)  -  -  € 4026.51  € 5276.33 
Maximum benefit (€ PPP)  € 1583.63  -  -  - 
Benefits for dependant  -  -  -  - 





child, € 47 
Amounts increase with 
each additional 
dependant 





Same amount by 
additional child. 
There is also a 
general tax 
allowance 
Means tested  Yes  Yes  -  Yes 
Additional unemployment 
benefit 
UB raised 10% 
if spouse  -  UA increased if 
dependants 
UB rate increases 
25% if children 
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Appendix C 
Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001) argue a sequential link between hours of work and 
reservation wages, which enable them to estimate hourly reservation wages against desired 
hours. Although we do not reject that it is a valid thing to do, we will discuss here the 
consequences,  in  econometrics  terms,  of  doing  so.  In  other  words,  in  this  appendix  we 
briefly  examine  the  role  that  desired  working  hours  plays  in  the  process  of  modelling 
reservation wages, to the extent that the individual’s answer to the former depend on the 
answer to the question on desired working hours
29. 
  As highlighted by Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001), since expected hours may also 
proxy individual’s preferences, unobserved individual specific preferences may cause hours 
to be correlated with the error term. A possible solution for the potential endogeneity of 
hours in the reservation wage equation is an instrumental variable procedure, which would 
correct for the expected bias that may affect the regressors’ coefficients
30. However finding a 
proper instrument is quite difficult since the variables affecting desired working hours and 
reservation wages may be the same. 
To analyse this problem the structural form of this model is specified in equations 
(A1) and (C2), under the lognormal assumption. Where ln(hit) and ln(wit) are respectively the 
logarithm of desired working hours and logarithm of (monthly/weekly) wages; Xit is a vector 
of  individual’s  characteristics;  ψit  and  ηit  represent  unobserved  individual  specific 
preferences. The stochastic error terms are u1t and u2t respectively. 
i it it it u X h 1 1
'
1 ) ln( + + + = y b a       (C1) 
i it it it it u X h w 2 2
'
2 ) ln( ) ln( + + + + = h b g a     (C2) 
If we compute (C2)-(C1) and assuming that the unobservables that affect the desired 
working hours are the same than those affecting the reservation wage (i.e. ηit= ψit) and γ=1, 
we obtain: 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ln( ) ln( 1 2 1 2
'
1 2 i i it it it u u X h w - + - + - = - b b a a   (C3) 
which is equivalent to this other one: 
i it it it X h w e b a + + =
' ) / ln(         (C4) 
where α= α2- α2, β= β2- β1 and εi= u2i- u1i. 
  This  is  the  expression  usually  estimated  in  the  literature,  which,  to  some  extent, 
allows to remove partly the problem of endogeneity above mentioned. However, Bloemen 
                                                 
29 As far as PSID and ECHP are concerned. 
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and Stancanelli (2001) go a step further by including (log) desired wages in the right hand 
side of equation (C4). Thus what they estimate is: 
i it it it it X h h w e b q a + + + =
' ) ln( ) / ln(       (C5) 
By doing a very simple algebraic transformation we achieve equation (C6), which 
can be simplified to attain expression (C7):  
i it it it it X h h w e b q a + + + + =
' ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(     (C6) 
i it it it X h w e b q a + + + + =
' ) ln( ) 1 ( ) ln(     (C7) 
It come out from expression (C7) that the model Bloemen and Stancanelli propose 
(C5) is in fact equivalent to run a regression where the dependent variable is (log) of wages 
without correcting for desired working hours as a function of desired working hours, but for 
the coefficient on desired working hours. If we want to get the value of θ we have just to 
subtract a value of 1 from the coefficient obtained in (C7). 
As long as the value we estimate for θ (from expression C5) is close to (-1), what this 
result  is  telling  us  is  that  estimating  (C7)  is  roughly  the  same,  in  terms  of  size  and 
significance level of β coefficients, as estimating an equation where the amount of desired 
hours is not taken into account.  
In our empirical approach (Table C1)
31 the estimation results we get for model (C5) 
support the conclusion reached in the previous paragraph. 
 
Table C1: OLS estimates of the Hourly Reservation Wage including desired hours as 
regressor 
  Specification I  Specification II 
  Both  Female  Male  Both  Female  Male 
Ln  (desired working hours)  -0.912***  -0.885***  -0.970***  -0.912***  -0.884***  -0.970*** 
  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Constant  4.684***  4.429***  4.932***  4.689***  4.435***  4.936*** 
  (0.044)  (0.062)  (0.059)  (0.044)  (0.062)  (0.060) 
Observations  14073  7617  6456  14073  7617  6456 
R2  0.62  0.64  0.59  0.62  0.64  0.59 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the hourly reservation wage. 
Additional control variables: Gender, age group, marital status, educational level, living or not with parents, 
number or children, Net family incomes, unemployment benefits dummy, regional unemployment rate, flag 
variable for imputed values in the regional unemployment variable, year and country dummy variables. 
Baseline category: Men, age 16-24, less than upper secondary education, single, widow or divorced, living 
away from parents’ home, no children, Spain. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                                                 
31 The full set of regressors is not reported for space reasons. They can be obtained from the author’s upon 
request. 